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Abstract 
The general purpose of this paper is to extend the literature regarding public good provision when consumers may 
contribute via consumption of an impure public good and/or by donating directly to the public good. Standard models 
pose consumer utility as a function of one impure public good and one or more private goods. Our model features two 
competing impure public goods and two private goods: one that is a conventional substitute good and one that is a 
numeraire. We build most directly upon Kotchen's (2005) model of “green” consumption of impure public goods. We 
propose national and local live theater arts as an example of competing impure public goods. Our model shows that if 
local and national live theater are substitutes, and the national live theater (such as the Met) is strengthened via 
technological change (for instance, via simulcasts into local venues), the overall sustainability of the live theater arts 
may be diminished.
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1.  Introduction 
There is a rich literature regarding the economics of public good provision when consumers 
may contribute by consuming a product that jointly yields private and public benefits and/or 
by making a donation that directly supports the public good.  The economics of contributing 
via consumption of a joint/mixed/impure product was set forth by Cornes and Sandler (1984, 
1994).  The impact of a donation mechanism alongside joint production was analyzed by 
Andreoni (1989, 1990) and Vicary (1997, 2000).  Most recently, Kotchen (2005) extended 
this literature with a model in which consumers choose among three products: a numeraire 
good, an impure public good that generates both a private and public characteristic, and a 
private conventional good substitute for the impure public good that generates only the 
private characteristic.  He then adds the donation possibility to this generalization and 
conducts comparative statics analysis within the extended framework.  Although Kotchen’s 
model generates a number of insights, all of the aforementioned models feature a single 
impure public good competing against one or more private goods.  The general purpose of 
this paper is to extend this line of inquiry to a framework in which consumers allocate 
consumption and donation resources among private goods and two competing impure public 
goods.   We find that the seemingly straightforward step of adding a second impure public 
good to the consumer choice framework greatly complicates the comparative statics results.  
While this is in some sense discouraging, the generalized model nevertheless enables us to 
point to specific sources of the complications that can arise in real-world policy-making. 
While the extension we pursue is of theoretical interest, we were motivated to explore 
it by a specific empirical question: Could the New York Metropolitan Opera’s relatively 
recent deployment of live simulcasts in hundreds of theaters across the U.S. be expected to 
strengthen or weaken local theater arts quantity/quality, and therefore strengthen or weaken 
the long-run sustainability of the theater arts in general?
1
 
 As Baumol and Bowen (1966) 
forewarned, technological progress presents something of a double-edged sword to the 
sustainability of the theater arts, not unlike the challenge technological progress poses to 
environmental quality and other public goods.  On one hand, the popularity of such 
technologically sophisticated Met simulcasts can be taken as evidence that the sustainability 
of the theater arts has been enhanced.  On the other hand, if such simulcasts from a national 
institution drive live local theater from the market, the effect of simulcast technology on the 
overall sustainability of theater arts is ambiguous.  Our instinct is that the Met and local 
theater productions can be considered competing impure public goods, and that therefore a 
conceptual structure like Kotchen’s, extended to two impure public goods, could help us 
understand how a number of exogenous factors combine to affect the sustainability of the 
theater arts.  Our resulting model confirms that if local and national live theater are 
substitutes, and the national live theater (such as the Metropolitan Opera of New York and its 
simulcasts into local venues) is strengthened via technological change, the overall 
sustainability of the live theater arts may be diminished.   
2.  Basic Concepts and Notation 
 
We proceed by setting forth Kotchen’s basic framework and then we introduce the notation 
for the second impure public good.  Kotchen follows Cornes and Sandler (1984, 1994) in 
                                                 
1 Recent data suggests that 1.8 million tickets to simulcasts were sold in 2009 and sales were on pace to surpass 
2.25 million in 2010.  
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303695604575182474127585754.html?mod=WSJ_newsreel_lifeStyle. 2 
utilizing the characteristics approach to consumer demand that was developed by Gorman 
(1980) and Lancaster (1971).  Consider a representative consumer who has well-defined 
preferences U over four characteristics: X, Y, W, and Z.  Characteristic X could be mass media 
entertainment or caffeine that is generated by consumption of conventional private goods 
such as movie theater tickets in the former case and by coffee in the latter (Kotchen) case.  
Characteristic Y is theatrical arts quality, cultural quality, or environmental quality on a 
broad, national scale that is provided by impure public goods such as the New York 
Metropolitan Opera in the former case or by shade-grown coffee in the latter case.  
Characteristic Y is valued by consumers to the extent that it captures what national arts 
endeavors such as the Met generate in utility to consumers in the current generation, as well 
as what they preserve for consumption by future generations on a national (if not global) 
level.  We contrast this source of utility from national public goods with characteristic W, 
which represents what is valued by consumers in local theater arts in the former case and 
local environmental quality in the latter case.  Characteristic W captures what consumers feel 
is distinctive about live theater focused upon local issues and produced by local artists.  Such 
productions therefore yield local benefits as well as public benefits that are passed to future 
generations and become part of the national arts legacy.  It is of course true that citizens of 
New York City may view the Met as a “local” theater; however, our belief is that local 
support for the Met is not so much with regard to preserving local theater as it is for 
preserving the Met as a national institution that produces and preserves theater that resonates 
in every state and village.  Finally, following Kotchen, we define characteristic Z as capturing 
in a numeraire manner all other characteristics of value to the consumer beyond 
characteristics X, Y, and W. 
  Turning now to the goods that generate these characteristics, we follow Kotchen in 
allowing for the impure public goods to generate multiple characteristics in (constant) linear 
fashion.  Good l (local live theater) generates characteristics X, Y and W according to: 
l X l α =                     (1) 
l Y l β =                     (2) 
l W γ =                     (3) 
Good n (national live theater) generates characteristics X and Y (and not W) according to: 
n X n α =                     (4) 
n Y n β =                     (5) 
Good c (conventional good such as movie tickets or DVDs) generates only characteristic X: 
c X =                      (6) 
Good z (numeraire good) generates only characteristic Z: 
z Z =                      (7) 
The last element in the set-up to note, again following Kotchen, is that since goods l and n are 
impure public goods, the representative consumer gains utility from others’ provision of these 
goods.  Thus, the amounts of Y and W that are produced are given by the sums of what the 
representative agent chooses and what all other agents choose.  The notation for this aspect 
will be specified below, where we set forth the representative agent’s maximization problem. 
 
3.  Optimal Choices in the Presence of a Conventional Substitute 
 
We follow Kotchen in this section by introducing a conventional substitute to our model in 
which a representative consumer has exogenous income m to allocate across that 
conventional good, a numeraire good, and two impure public goods (one local and one 
national).  Given our assumptions, the consumer’s problem is: 3 
( ) { } m n P l P c P Z W Y X Z U Max n l c = + + + , , ,   with          (8) 
n l c X n l α α + + =                   (9) 
Y n l Y n l
~
+ + = β β                   (10) 
W l W
~
+ = γ                     (11) 
As in Cornes and Sandler (1984) and Kotchen (2005), it is advantageous here to transform 
the problem from goods space to characteristics space, so that the demands for the 
characteristics can be derived as functions of public good contributions from others.  To do so 
in our model, we rearrange (9), (10) and (11) to obtain: 
n l X c n l α α − − =                   (9’) 
n
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  Substituting into (8), we obtain the two-impure-























l n l l c
n
c l n P P
Y
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          (12) 
Note that in Kotchen’s eq. (2), W = 0;  1 = = n n β α ;  0 = = l l β α ; and his  g P is equivalent to 
our  n P .  In our work below, we maintain Kotchen’s assumption that  1 = = n n β α ; and in that 
spirit, to simplify notation, we set  1 = = l l β α as well to obtain (13): 
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Assuming that  c n l P P P > >  (to ensure positive implicit characteristic prices) and that an 
interior solution exists, we now wish to conduct comparative statics on the demand for 
national and local theater quality, 
c Y ˆ  and 
c W ˆ  (analogous to Kotchen’s environmental 
quality, 
c Y ˆ ) with respect to our exogenous parameters. (Superscript c denotes the case in 
which there is a conventional substitute good available.)  As Kotchen sets forth, the demand 
for national theater quality in our model is an implicit function of the price of characteristics 
Y, X and W, as well as effective income (the right-hand side of eq. (13)).  In the case of Y, we 
have  ( ) Γ = , , , ˆ ˆ
w x y















c W ˆ is defined analogously.  As Kotchen describes, we 
                                                 
2 While we model the representative agent’s utility as increasing in the linear sum of public good contributions 
from others, we are grateful to the anonymous referee for calling our attention to the possibility that a best-shot 
technology may be more appropriate in the national/international theater arts context.  We should like to explore 
this possibility more fully in future research.  4 
would then want to differentiate this function with respect to each parameter and substitute 
the appropriate Slutsky decompositions into each of those results. 
  The first comparative static we wish to consider is the effect of a change in  n P  on 
c Y ˆ .  
Letting subscripts denote partial derivatives, we have the following:   
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c c c c c c c c
P w y n
~
~
ˆ 1 ˆ ˆ 0 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ
γ γ
π π       (14) 
A bit of algebra simplifies (14) to: 
( ) ( )
c c c c c c
P n l Y Y Y Y
w y n ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ − + − = Γ π π               (15) 
Note first that Kotchen’s result immediately follows from our eq. (14) by setting 
c
w Yπ  and 
c lˆ  
equal to zero.  (Another way to see the difference in our models is to write eq. (15) as 
( )
c c c c c c c
P l Y Y Y n Y Y
w y n
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
Γ Γ + − − = π π , where the two new terms follow Kotchen’s result in the 
parentheses.)  The interpretation of these terms and the resulting sign is as follows.  The first 
term on the right hand side is the own price substitution effect (negative).  The next term is 
the cross-price effect, which is positive if W and Y are substitutes and negative if they are 
complements.  Thus, the terms in the first bracket yield a negative sign if W and Y are 
substitutes (the case we feel is most likely).  The 
c YΓ ˆ  term is positive for normal goods (which 
we assume) and negative for inferior goods.  Lastly, the terms in the right hand bracket 
represent the relative quantities of l and n, respectively.  This of course can be positive or 
negative.  If it is negative (which is to say, if 
c c n l ˆ ˆ ≤ ), then  0 ˆ <
c
Pn Y  as Kotchen finds in his 
analysis when only one impure public good and a conventional substitute are available.  
Indeed, his result immediately obtains from our eq. (15) above by setting 
c
w Yπ  and 
c lˆ  equal to 
zero.  However, if 
c c n l ˆ ˆ > , and/or if Y and W are complements rather than substitutes, 
c
Pn Y ˆ can 
be positive.  When  n P  rises, n falls and therefore 
c Y ˆ  falls.  But if l is a substitute for n, then 
c Y ˆ  rises with l, (since both l and n produce Y).  The greater l that is chosen relative to n, the 
more likely 
c
Pn Y ˆ  is to be positive. 
  Using the same methodology, we have the following additional comparative statics 
and analogous interpretations: 
( ) ( )
c c c c c c
P n l W W W W
w y n ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ − + − = Γ π π               (16) 
( ) ( )
c c c c c c
P c n Y Y Y Y
y x c ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ − + − = Γ π π               (17) 
( ) ( )
c c c c c c
P c n W W W W
y x c ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ − + − = Γ π π               (18) 
Turning now to the impact that the price of the local impure public good may have upon the 
quality of the national public good, we have:   
( )
c c c c
P l Y Y Y
w l
ˆ ˆ ˆ − + = Γ π                   (19) 
( )
c c c c
P l W W W
w l
ˆ ˆ ˆ − + = Γ π                   (20) 
Here the results are clearer in that we have only one ambiguous term rather than two.  The 
first term of eq. (19) is the cross-price effect, which is positive if characteristics W and Y are 
substitutes and negative if they are complements.  Thus, if the public good characteristics are 
complements, the sign of eq. (19) is clearly negative and an increase in the price of local live 
theater can reduce the quality of nationally provided theater.  However, if the public good 
characteristics are substitutes, an increase in the price of l raises the implicit price of W, 5 
leading consumers to favor more Y as a substitute.  This substitution can be strong enough to 
cause an overall increase in Y when the price of local theater tickets increases.  
  The last set of comparative statics to examine in this context regards technology 
parameters.  Unfortunately, the results (available from the authors upon request) are quite 
complicated and do not yield clear implications without a number of assumptions.  The result 
for 
c
n Wβ ˆ  deserves special consideration, however, as it speaks to the empirical question with 
which our paper began: could a technological improvement in the provision of a national 
public good—e.g., the introduction of live simulcasts of the New York Metropolitan Opera—
reduce the provision of live local theater?  That comparative static is given by: 
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~ ˆ ˆ ˆ ~ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
π π β γ
β
α     (21) 
The answer to our question is in the affirmative if either the first or second bracketed terms in 
eq. (21) are negative and the other is positive.  In terms of the first bracketed term, even 
though  c n P P >  by assumption, this does not imply that  c n n P P α > .  Thus, the first bracketed 
term could be positive or negative.  Likewise, inspection of the terms within the second set of 
brackets reveals that the entire term can be positive or negative.  Thus, while our comparative 
static analysis is not able to determine this sign, the analysis nevertheless shows why 
c
n Wβ ˆ  can 
be negative, and therefore how a technological improvement in the provision of one public 
good can undermine provision of related public goods. 
 
4.  Donation Parameters 
 
As with Kotchen’s impure public good model, our model can include a donation option.  
Considering how dependent theaters typically are upon these donations, it is important to 
extend our model likewise in this direction.
3
The representative consumer’s problem is thus: 
     
( ) { } m n P l P c P z W Y X Z U Max n l c = + + + , , ,  when c > 0 and d = 0      (22) 
(which is the same as eq. (8)) and X, Y, and W are defined as in eqs. (9)-(11) and 
( ) { } m n P l P d P z W Y X Z U Max n l d = + + + , , ,  when c = 0 and d > 0     (23) 
where X, Y, and W are defined as follows: 
n l X n l α α + =                   (24) 
d Y n l Y n l + + + =
~
β β                 (25) 
d W l W + + =
~
γ                   (26) 
While donations in Kotchen’s model generate characteristic Y, donations in the present model 
generate both public characteristics Y and W.  As in the previous section, to simplify notation 
in the work that follows, we set  1 = = i i β α  for all i but preserve parameter γ  for the time 
being.  As Kotchen (2005, 295-296) notes, the dual constraints emerge in our eqs. (22) and 
(23) from reasonable assumptions regarding relative prices.  In our model, those assumptions 
                                                 
3 Hansmann (1981) is a key paper in this literature.  For discussion of a recent major donation to the New York 
Metropolitan Theater, see http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/27/arts/music/27gift.html?_r=1&ref=arts. 
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> .  For instance, we might have 
20 $ = l P ;  16 $ = d P ;  10 $ = n P ;  5 $ = c P ; and 1 = γ .
4
would not choose to make a donation and consume the conventional good.  For analogous to 
Kotchen’s observation in the one-impure-public good framework, any amounts of 
characteristics X, Y, and W the consumer seeks by a combination of c and d can be acquired at 
a lower cost by increasing consumption of good l and reducing consumption of c and 
donations d.  Thus, c + d cannot be part of an optimal bundle. 
  This implies that a consumer  
  Now, as in the previous sections, a good bit of algebra can be carried out with regard 
to eqs. (23)-(26) to transform the maximization problem from one based upon goods to one 
based upon characteristics. Doing so yields: 
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when c = 0 and d > 0.  (Note that since eq. (22) is the same as eq. (13) (the conventional good 
substitute is purchased in lieu of making donations), we analyze only the problem expressed 
in eq. (23).)  The demand for characteristic Y can be expressed as  ( ) Γ = , , , ˆ ˆ
W X Y
d d Y Y π π π , 
where the superscript d denotes the scenario in which donations are made, and implicit prices 

















































d W ˆ  is 
defined analogously. 
We are able to derive a number of comparative statics (available from the authors 
upon request).  As was the case in Section 3 (the case in which there is a conventional 
substitute good available), we are not able to definitively sign any of the comparative statics 
when a donation mechanism is also in place.  Indeed, consistent with our intuition, the 
presence of a donation mechanism serves to further complicate the relationship between the 
two impure public goods in our model.  To round out our analysis, we are also able to 
generalize eq. (27) by retrieving the technology parameters α  andβ  that were previously set 
equal to one.  Our purpose in doing so is to return to the primary empirical question of our 
interest: could a technological improvement in the provision of a national public good—e.g., 
the introduction of live simulcasts of the New York Metropolitan Opera—reduce the 
provision of live local theater, and therefore on balance undermine the sustainability of the 
theater arts?  The generalization of eq. (27) yields: 
( )
( )
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4 Note, however, that these relative prices, as well as those in eq. (13), would be more complicated if all α ’s 
and β ’s had not been set equal to one. 7 

























































































































































































~             (28) 
We are then theoretically in the position of being able to derive 
d
n Wβ ˆ  and have confirmed that 
its sign, analogous to the sign of 
c
n Wβ ˆ , is indeterminate.
5
 
  Thus in both contexts in which a 
conventional substitute good is available and when a donation mechanism is also available, 
we are able to say that technological improvement in the provision of one impure public good 
has a potentially deleterious effect upon the provision of related impure public goods.  If this 
effect is strong enough, such technological improvement that may be expected to raise the 
overall sustainability of the theater arts may actually reduce sustainability.  
5.  Directions for Future Research 
 
One area for future research is to consider possible policy intervention tools that can raise the 
sustainability of the local good when there is evidence that the market is not naturally 
providing the socially efficient rate of support.  One analogue to this situation may be the use 
some local communities have made of tax increment financing of historic downtown 
properties following the construction of the interstate highway system on the perimeters of 
towns.  In such cases, the tax revenue increment is collected from new businesses established 
along the non-local public good (highway) and transferred to local, historic areas adversely 
affected by the shift in economic activity.  Secondly, in the process of utilizing Kotchen’s 
economic model of environmental quality provision to analyze the sustainability of the 
theater arts, we realized that while these topics may be considered separately, consumer 
choices in one realm are likely related to consumer decisions in the other realm.  That is to 
say, consumers who are inclined to support environmental quality with their purchases and/or 
donations are quite likely to be consumers who are inclined to support the arts.  Thus, where 
Kotchen finds that the introduction of a donation mechanism can reduce environmental 
quality, our model sheds light on a further possibility: consumers who raise their 
consumption of—or donation to—one public good (such as the theater arts) may significantly 
reduce their consumption of—or donation to—another public good (such as environmental 
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